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The U.S. Embargo
against Cuba and the
Diplomatic Challenges to
Extraterritoriality
Joy Gordon

Many analysts have criticized the U.S. embargo against Cuba as
an anachronistic holdover from the Cold War. Yet its problems go well
beyond that. In many regards, the U.S. embargo against Cuba represents a
caricature of the various American misapplications of economic sanctions:
if the goal is to end the Castro regime this policy has not only failed, but
has spent half a century doing so. If the intent is to support Cubans in
their aspirations for a different political system the sanctions have failed in
that regard as well, since even the most vocal dissidents in Cuba criticize
the embargo. In the face of the “smart sanctions” movement to develop
economic tools that target the leadership rather than the people, the
embargo against Cuba represents the opposite pole: it impacts the Cuban
population indiscriminately, affecting everything from family travel, to the
publication of scientific articles by Cuban scholars, to the cost of buying
chicken for Cuban households.
This article will briefly describe the history and the main components of the U.S. embargo against Cuba, and the impact of the unilateral
measures on Cuba’s economy. It will look at some of the ways in which
the U.S. embargo is “extraterritorial”—impacting Cuba’s trade with third
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countries—as well as ways in which the United States’ unilateral embargo
functions in effect as a global measure. It will then examine the overwhelming response of the international community, and in particular, the
United Nations General Assembly, in condemning the embargo as a violation of international law. This response represents a diplomatic challenge
to the United States that is unparalleled in the last fifty years of global
governance.
THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA

The U.S. embargo against Cuba began when President Eisenhower
severed ties with Cuba in early 1961 under the Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA) which allowed the president to impose economic sanctions on a
hostile country during wartime “or any other period of national emergency
declared by the President.” Later that year, Congress passed the Foreign
Assistance Act banning all aid to communist countries. Under its authority, in
1962, President Kennedy issued a proclamation which prohibited “the importation into the United States of all goods of Cuban origin and goods imported
from or through Cuba.” This was the original framework for the embargo.
The Cuban Assets Controls Regulations (CACR), issued under
the TWEA, authorized the Treasury Department to regulate commercial
transactions. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) issues the specific regulations that implement the embargo. These
regulations have varied to some extent with changes in administration.
However, the discretion of the President to remove or alter the terms of
the embargo was limited when Congress passed two additional laws in the
1990s, the “Cuba Democracy Act” and the “Liberated Act,” which further
tightened the embargo. In 2000, Congress passed the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act providing limited exceptions to the
embargo, primarily by allowing U.S. companies to sell agricultural and
medical products to Cuba, subject to a number of limitations. In addition,
there are other measures, outside the embargo legislation and regulations,
that have the effect of tightening the embargo further, such as the restrictions on selling technology to countries the United States considers to be
“state sponsors of terrorism”, and the denial of visas to Cubans who wish to
visit the United States for personal or professional reasons.
The embargo not only deprives Cuba of access to U.S. markets and
goods, but interferes in its trade with third countries; prohibits U.S. dollar
transactions, even with banks and trade partners in third countries; prohibits
most travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens; interferes in Cuba’s internet access and
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roaming agreements for cell phones; denies Cuba access to global financial
institutions; prohibits the sale of equipment to Cuban research scientists by
U.S. companies or their foreign subsidiaries; prevents Cubans from visiting
family members in the United States;
and often blocks scientific and cultural
exchanges. Other embargoes, such as In some regards the U.S.
the Security Council sanctions imposed measures against Cuba
on Iraq in the 1990s, have caused greater are far more extensive,
humanitarian harm than the U.S.
affecting every aspect of
embargo against Cuba. Yet, in some
regards the U.S. measures against Cuba commerce, travel, economic
are far more extensive, affecting every development, and even
aspect of commerce, travel, economic humanitarian contributions.
development, and even humanitarian
contributions. Overall, Cuba estimates
the total damages from the U.S. embargo to be in excess of $100 billion.1
UNILATERAL MEASURES

Conventional wisdom holds that multilateral embargoes are more
effective than unilateral embargoes. But while U.S. unilateral measures have
not been effective at ending the Castro regime, they have had a far greater
impact on Cuba’s economy and society than would ordinarily be expected
of a unilateral trade embargo. This is partly because the United States would
be Cuba’s largest and closest trading partner, and the lack of access to U.S.
markets means that Cuba is excluded from buying a broad range of U.S.
goods that cost less to buy and transport than comparable goods produced
elsewhere in the world. According to a study by the Congressional Research
Service, imports to Cuba were 30 percent higher overall as a result of the
embargo.2 For example, Braille machines produced in the United States,
used for teaching blind and partially sighted children, are significantly less
expensive than those produced elsewhere. Consequently, Cuba’s costs when
it buys Braille machines for schools are $1100 per machine, rather than
$700 for the machines produced in the United States.3 Likewise, because
cytostatic serums, used to treat certain types of malignant tumors, cannot
be purchased from U.S. companies, Cuba buys them from Europe or
Asia, or through third countries, which significantly increases their costs.4
Additionally, according to the UN Human Settlements Program, Cuba’s
inability to purchase construction materials from U.S. sources adversely
affects cost and logistics to such a degree that it undermines the availability
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of adequate housing in Cuba. On one occasion, this lack of access to cheap
U.S. materials compromised Cuba’s “response to housing reconstruction
needs resulting from destructive hurricanes in 2001 and 2002, in both
cases primarily affecting the most vulnerable sectors of the population.”5
Thus, even as a unilateral measure, the fact that the embargo denies Cuba
access to U.S. markets is itself costly and damaging to the Cuban economy.
Even cultural exchanges between the two countries are affected by
the embargo and related measures. Under the Bush administration, Cuban
artists, musicians, scientists, and scholars were routinely denied visas to come
to the United States to attend professional conferences, to perform their
music, or to attend a gallery opening when their art was exhibited. There
were harsh restrictions on family visits. There were regulatory roadblocks
making it prohibitively difficult for U.S. universities to establish academic
partnerships with Cuban universities. The Obama administration has eased
up on some of these, allowing greater family travel and issuing more visas
for artists and professionals, but most of the restrictions remain in place.
EXTRATERRITORIALITY

The U.S. embargo is not limited to unilateral measures of the sort
described above. The embargo is also extraterritorial: it interferes in Cuba’s
trade with companies located in third countries. The Torricelli and HelmsBurton laws greatly increased the extraterritorial impact of the embargo,
and they came at a time when Cuba’s economic situation was particularly
precarious. Eighty-five percent of Cuba’s trade had been with the Eastern
bloc, and in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba made
drastic changes in its economy. In 1991, Cuba rapidly began establishing
new trading partners, focusing on Canada, Mexico, Europe, and Latin
America. Thus, the extraterritorial measures imposed by the United States
were particularly damaging at the juncture when Cuba was working as
quickly as possible to establish new trade relations.
In 1992, Congress passed the “Cuban Democracy Act,” introduced
by Senator Robert Torricelli.6 Since 1975, foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations had routinely been given licenses to trade with Cuba, as long
as the subsidiary functioned independently of the parent corporation and
no U.S. goods or U.S. dollar transactions were involved.7 The Torricelli
law prohibited these licenses, with the result that foreign subsidiaries
were treated the same as U.S. corporations, with violators subject to the
same penalties as U.S. companies. This constituted a clear international
law, which holds that “a company is ordinarily considered to be a national
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of the state under the laws of which it is organized.”8 In addition, the
Torricelli law imposed restrictions on shipping: any vessel that enters Cuba
to provide goods or services, regardless of the country of origin, cannot
stop at a U.S. port for 180 days; otherwise, both the ship and its cargo are
subject to confiscation. This applies even to goods that the United States
considers permissible such as Cuban imports of food from third countries.
The Torricelli law also prohibits third countries from selling goods
to the United States that contain any amount of Cuban materials or any
materials that have passed through Cuba.9 For example, no metal products
can be sold to the United States that
contain even trace amounts of Cuban
nickel, one of Cuba’s major exports. For example, no metal
Likewise, no Belgian chocolate may products can be sold to the
be sold in the United States unless the
United States that contain
Belgian government provides assurances to the U.S. government that the even trace amounts of Cuban
chocolate contains no Cuban sugar, nickel, one of Cuba’s major
an export that is critical to the Cuban exports. Likewise, no Belgian
economy.10
chocolate may be sold in
In 1996, the Helms-Burton Act,
the United States unless the
known as the “Libertad Act,”11 added
other extraterritorial provisions. Title Belgian government provides
III of the act stipulates that foreign assurances to the U.S.
companies that invest in Cuban prop- government that the chocolate
erties that were nationalized by the contains no Cuban sugar, an
Cuban state after the Revolution are
export that is critical to the
subject to suit by the original owners,
if they are now U.S. nationals, in U.S. Cuban economy.
courts.12 Thus, a former Cuban citizen
who owned a plantation in Cuba in
the 1950s could now sue a Spanish hotel chain that built a hotel on that
land in 2010, if the ex-Cuban is now a U.S. citizen. In addition, Title IV
provides that the officers and executives of companies using or investing in
those Cuban properties, and their families, may be barred from entering
the United States.13 The Helms-Burton Act also prohibits the import of
any goods that are of Cuban origin, in whole or in part, or were manufactured or produced in Cuba, in any part, or were ever located in or transported from or through Cuba. These restrictions apply not only to goods
imported into the United States, but to transactions that take place entirely
outside the United States.14
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IMPACTS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES

International banking

The U.S. embargo measures interfere in Cuba’s access to international
banks in several ways, even when they are not U.S. financial institutions.
The United States prohibits Cuba from engaging in any transactions in
U.S. dollars, and likewise prohibits any bank—including foreign banks—
from facilitating commercial transactions by Cuba in U.S. dollars. In
recent years, particularly under the Bush administration, the United States
has enforced the banking provisions aggressively. The United States fined
the Swiss bank UBS $100 million for engaging in U.S. dollar transactions
with Cuba, and also imposed smaller fines on Italian and Spanish banks.
In 2006, the United States blacklisted the Dutch bank, UNG, which had
done business in Cuba for over a decade; the following year UNG terminated its banking operations in Cuba.15 In 2009, the Treasury Department
imposed a fine of $5.75 million on the Australia and New Zealand Banking
Group, Ltd., for financial transactions involving Cuba and Sudan, and also
fined Credit Suisse Bank almost half a billion dollars for financial transactions involving Cuba and other countries subject to U.S. embargoes.16
By 2007, in spite of their own national legislation prohibiting compliance with the U.S. embargo, a number of major Canadian and European
banks stopped doing business with Cuba including Barclays, the Bank of
Nova Scotia, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, and
HSBC.17 These measures impede Cuba’s commerce in a number of ways.
For many transactions, there are additional costs in using currencies other
than the dollar. Because so many major international banks no longer
provide banking services to Cuba out of fear of U.S. retaliation, Cuba has
had to turn to other banks, which charge higher rates for their services.
For 1998, a State Department official maintained that, because of U.S.
measures, interest rates for financing Cuban development projects reached
22 percent.18 In 2009, Cuba estimated that the losses related to financing
costs attributable to the embargo came to $164 million.19
International mergers and acquisitions

The extraterritoriality impact of the U.S. embargo expands further
when U.S. companies acquire or merge with foreign companies, since the
Torricelli law treats these new subsidiaries as U.S. entities. For example,
Cuba contracted with the German company, Bayer, to buy pesticides. After
vol.36:1 winter 2012
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Bayer began manufacturing one of the ingredients in the United States, it
sought a license from the United States to continue exporting the pesticides to Cuba but was denied. Bayer then cancelled its contract with Cuba.
Likewise, Cuba had a longstanding business relation with Sanachem, a
South African company. After the U.S. company Dow Chemical bought
shares in Sanachem, the South African company no longer sold goods
to Cuba.20 On another occasion, a British company which had agreed to
sell meteorological equipment to Cuba, Pascall Electronics Limited, was
acquired by the U.S. company EMRISE. Cuba’s purchase from the British
company was cancelled after the U.S. government denied EMRISE a
license.21
The impact is particularly visible in Cuba’s medical and biotechnology sectors. Indeed, this is an explicit priority of the Torricelli law, which
provides that while exceptions may be granted to allow sales of medicines
and medical supplies, even those are not permitted if they “could be used in
the production of any biotechnological product.”22 For example, in 1995,
Cuba lost access to medical goods when “the U.S. company Upjohn merged
with the Swedish firm Pharmacia, which since 1970 had been selling
medical equipment, reagents, chemotherapy drugs, and other products
to a Cuban company. Cuba also lost an important supplier of diagnostic
materials when Wisconsin’s Sybron International acquired Germany’s Nuc.
Sales of pacemakers for heart patients were suddenly halted when Siemens
of Sweden and Teletronics Pacing System of Australia transferred production and ownership to the United States.”23
The mergers, in in conjunction with the measures targeting Cuba’s
medical and biotech industries, affect not only the activities of Cuban
institutions, but also the work of international humanitarian organizations
in Cuba. In 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) had purchased
certain radioactive isotopes used to treat malignant tumors in the Cuban
population from the Canadian company MDS Nordion. The WHO could
no longer do so after MDS Nordion was acquired by the U.S. company
Varian Medical Systems.24 In 2004, when the WHO sought to buy laboratory reagents to provide medical services in Cuba from the British company
Oxoid, it could not, because Oxoid had been acquired by a U.S. company.25
Global effects

In some regards, because of the extraordinary power held by the
United States in many domains, the U.S. unilateral embargo functions as
a global embargo. The Helms-Burton Act effectively blocks Cuba’s access
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to global financial institutions—including the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank—by requiring
the U.S. representatives on their boards
to vote against granting Cuba memberIn some regards, because of
ship or access to loans or development
the extraordinary power held funds. Because voting is weighted, it is
by the United States in many nearly impossible for any of these organizations to admit Cuba or provide
domains, the U.S. unilateral loans or development aid. In the IMF,
embargo functions as a
the United States holds almost 17
global embargo.
percent of the votes; only three other
countries—France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom—hold more than
4 percent of the votes. By contrast, over 90 countries hold 0.1 percent
of the vote or less.26 The World Bank has roughly the same structure.27
In the unlikely event that the U.S. vote is not sufficient to deny Cuba
access to financing from the organization, the Helms-Burton Act would
then imposes punitive measures: if the institution were to somehow extend
loans or aid to Cuba, the United States will reduce its contribution to that
institution by the same amount.28
Cuba’s lack of access to major global financial institutions has been
particularly damaging in the context of Cuba’s economic crisis, “increasing
the difficulties of negotiating debt settlements and credit with public and
commercial creditors, including Paris Club creditors.”29 The UN coordinator of aid activities in Cuba notes that, while it is difficult to quantify
the effect of this exclusion, “Cuba is one of the few countries in the world
facing a deep restructuring of its economy without assistance from international financial institutions.”30
There are also other ways in which the U.S. embargo effectively
excludes Cuba from global financial networks. For example, international
monetary transfers between banks take place through a network called the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)
system. Without access to this system, it is not possible to wire money or
deposit a check sent from another country. The SWIFT system has released
new software which will be the only means of accessing the system starting
in March 2012. The SWIFT network has informed Cuba that it will
not provide Cuba with this software, “because it contains United States
technologies and components subject to the restrictions of the economic
embargo.”31
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THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Retaliatory legislation

The intrusiveness of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and the 1996
Libertad Act created a backlash among American allies, and a number of
major American trading partners responded with retaliatory legislation.
After the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, Canada’s Prime Minister Jean
Chretien denounced it as interference in Canada’s affairs: “If you want to
have an isolationist policy, that’s your business. But don’t tell us what to
do. That’s our business.”32 Canada additionally denounced the U.S. law as
a violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the
grounds that the U.S. Congress was seeking to impose its foreign policy
on other nations,33 and initiated a complaint under NAFTA procedures.34
Canada also responded by passing an amendment to its Foreign ExtraTerritorial Measures Act (FEMA): in the event that a plaintiff obtained
a judgment against a Canadian national under the Helms-Burton Act,
the “clawback legislation” authorized Canada’s attorney general to block
enforcement. FEMA also imposed penalties of up to 1 million Canadian
dollars on Canadian nationals if they complied with the Helms-Burton
Act. Similarly, Mexico responded with retaliatory legislation, which went
into effect in October 1996. Like FEMA, Mexico’s Law for Protection of
Trade and Investment prohibits compliance with extraterritorial measures,
authorizes Mexican courts to decline to recognize judgments issued by
U.S. courts under the Helms-Burton Act, and authorizes Mexicans subject
to such judgments to bring suit in Mexican court for compensation.35
The European Union took a similar course in response to HelmsBurton. A European Council regulation stated: “The U.S. has enacted
laws that purport to regulate activities of persons under the jurisdiction
of the member states of the European Union; this extra-territorial application violates international law and has adverse effects on the interest of
the European Union.”36 In addition, the EU brought an action against the
United States before the newly-minted World Trade Organization (WTO)
in February 1997, for interfering in trade in violation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In its defense, the United States
argued that the Helms-Burton Act was a matter of national security, and
therefore exempt from GATT.37 The United States then maintained that,
having asserted the Helms-Burton Act was a matter of national security,
no WTO panel could review that determination or question its validity.38
The matter nearly created an institutional crisis for the new organization:
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if any nation could claim exemption for national security, using its judgment to determine for itself what constituted “national security,” then the
WTO as an institution of global governance and dispute resolution would
be profoundly undermined. Ultimately, the matter was resolved diplomatically when the Clinton administration agreed to suspend the enforcement
of Titles III and IV, and work with Congress to repeal the legislation. In
return, the EU did not pursue its action before the WTO.
Despite the “clawback” legislation adopted by Canada, Mexico, and
the EU, there were nevertheless cancellations of significant foreign investment projects, particularly in the first few years after the Helms-Burton Act
went into effect. CEMEX, a Mexican company, cancelled a joint venture
with Cuba for cement production; Redpath, a Canadian sugar refiner that
had been purchasing 100,000 tons of sugar from Cuba per year, withdrew
from Cuba; and British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate cancelled an exploration project in Cuba.39
Statements of condemnation

In addition to the WTO action and retaliatory legislation by
Canada, Mexico, and the European Union, U.S. embargo measures have
also met broad, consistent international condemnation. In 2009 and 2010,
for example, statements of condemnation came from the XV Summit of
the Non-Aligned Movement held in Egypt in 2009,40 the II Africa-South
America Summit (ASA) in 2009,41 the VII Summit of the countries of the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of the Americas (ALBA) in 2009,42 the
Unity Summit of 2010, consisting of the XXI Rio Group Summit and
the II Summit of Latin America and the Caribbean on Integration and
Development (CALC),43 and the VI Summit of Latin America and the
Caribbean and the European Union.44
UN General Assembly resolutions

It is not surprising that Cuba would have support from the developing world, particularly its trading partners in Latin America and the
Caribbean. A more dramatic demonstration of the breadth of international
opposition to the legality of the U.S. embargo legislation was the series
of annual votes before the UN General Assembly, which began in 1992.
After the Torricelli law was passed, Cuba introduced a resolution before
the UN General Assembly that called upon member states not to implement its provisions and expressed concern about the extraterritorial effects
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and their consequent violation of the principle of equal sovereignty.45 The
resolution passed by a vote of 59 to 3, with 71 abstentions and 46 nations
not voting. International support for
Cuba’s resolutions has grown steadily
from 1992 through the present, as International support for
states that had abstained in one year Cuba’s resolutions has grown
voted “yes” the next, and then continue steadily from 1992 through
to do so each year. While the 1992
the present, as states that had
resolution had 59 votes in favor, the
next year’s resolution had 88 votes in abstained in one year voted
favor, 4 opposed, and 92 abstaining or “yes” the next, and then
not voting.46 For each of the last several continue to do so each year.
years, over 180 members—out of 193
in the United Nations—have joined
Cuba in condemning this U.S. violation of international trade law. Most
recently, in October 2011, 186 countries voted in support of Cuba’s resolution, two opposed it, and three abstained.
The only nation that has consistently joined the United States in
voting against the resolutions has been Israel, the highest recipient of U.S.
foreign aid amounting to $3 billion annually.47 The United States and Israel
are typically joined by, at most, one or two other states in opposing the
Cuban resolution. Last fall, only the United States and Israel voted against
the measure, while Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia abstained
— all of them dependent on the United States.
The annual resolutions call upon member states “to refrain from
promulgating and applying laws and measures” such as the Helms-Burton
Act, and request the Secretary General to prepare a report on the implementation of the resolutions. Consequently, each year the Secretary General
has produced a report incorporating information from member states and
international organizations regarding their compliance with the resolution.
In these reports, Cuba provides detailed lists of the particular transactions
that were canceled or affected by the embargo, as well as an estimate of the
financial cost of its damages. Some nations simply state that they are in
compliance and have normal commercial relations with Cuba, while others
provide a more extensive statement of condemnation. In the 2010 report,
for example, Burundi responded, “Burundi has never enforced the embargo
against the Republic of Cuba,”48 whereas countries with strong commercial or political ties to Cuba provide additional commentary. Bolivia, for
example, states, “the embargo is a criminal policy which, according to very
conservative estimates, has caused losses of over $230 billion since it was
vol.36:1 winter 2012
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imposed almost 50 years ago, constituting an unlawful act from every viewpoint.”49 The EU comments each year on its agreement with the Clinton
administration, which had agreed to take certain measures in exchange for
the withdrawal of the EU’s WTO complaint:
[O]n 18 May 1998, at the European Union/United States Summit
in London, a package was agreed covering waivers to titles III and
IV of the Helms-Burton Act; a commitment by the United States
administration to resist future extraterritorial legislation of that kind;
and an understanding with respect to disciplines for the strengthening of investment protection. 50

Each year, the EU states rather pointedly that it “continues to urge
the United States to implement its side of the Understanding of 18 May
1998.”51
CONCLUSION

Security Council resolutions are often said to represent “the international community.” Formally, this is correct because the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to act on behalf of the international community,
and member states are signatories to the Charter.52 But of course, the
Council is a counter-majoritarian institution, consisting of only fifteen
members with no permanent representation from the Arab world, Africa,
or Latin America. Internally, the Council is also counter-majoritarian in
that any of the permanent members can veto a measure even if every other
member of the Council supports it. Thus, the Council can only represent “the international community” in
a republican sense, while its positions
It is striking that Cuba has
may in fact diverge from those of the
achieved such extraordinary majority of nations, or the majority of
the world’s population.
support from nearly every
By contrast, a vote in the General
nation in the international
Assembly, as a democratic body with
community, all of whom
equal representation for all member
have nothing to gain and
states, is an explicit, direct expression of “the will of the international
everything to lose by risking
community.” The disparity between
the wrath of the U.S.
the Security Council, which is so thoroughly dominated by the permanent
members, and the General Assembly, is particularly evident in the case of
the U.S. embargo against Cuba. The Security Council presumably could
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never castigate the U.S. for any action it took under any circumstances,
given the veto power held by the U.S. But in the General Assembly—a
venue that operates democratically, and where the U.S. holds no extraordinary powers—it is clear that the opposition is nearly universal. It is striking
that Cuba has achieved such extraordinary support from nearly every
nation in the international community, all of whom have nothing to gain
and everything to lose by risking the wrath of the U.S.
For decades, American administrations have consistently portrayed
the Cuban regime as isolated and marginalized by the international
community for its human rights record. But in the case of the American
embargo against Cuba, it seems that the international community is nearly
unanimous in the view that it is the United States that has little respect
for international law and global governance. This is evident from the challenges within the WTO; retaliatory legislation from Mexico, Canada, and
the European Union; broad diplomatic denunciations in Africa, Latin
America, and the Caribbean; and the annual UN General Assembly votes
of condemnation. The fact that nearly all U.S. allies and trading partners
endorse Cuba’s condemnation of the United States, and have done so every
year for almost two decades, says a great deal about the global opinion of
the American actions. n
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APPENDIX

UN General Assembly Votes on Cuba Embargo-Related Resolutions,
1992-2011
Year

Votes in favor

Abstentions

Votes opposed

1992

59

71

3

1993

88

57

4

1994

101

48

2

1995

117

38

3

1996

137

25

3

1997

143

17

3

1998

157

12

2

1999

155

8

2

2000

167

4

3

2001

167

3

3

2002

173

4

3

2003

179

3

3

2004

179

1

4

2005

182

1

4

2006

183

1

4

2007

184

1

4

2008

185

2

3

2009

187

2

3

2010

187

3

2

2011

186

3

2
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